

1. Preamble: Attitudes *de se/re*

• David's pants are on fire, and he doesn't realize it. Looking in a mirror, he either (a) recognizes himself and thinks, "My god, *I'm* on fire" or (b) doesn't and thinks, "Hey, *that guy's* on fire."

(1) David_i thinks that his_i pants are on fire.

• **(1) has two readings describing two very different cognitive states;** (a)'s is *de se*, and (b)'s is *de re*.

2. A toy semantics

• **De se ascription is property ascription** (Lewis 1979, Chierchia 1989)

$\llbracket (1) \rrbracket^{de\ se} \leftrightarrow$ David *self-ascribes* on-fire:

(2) think ($\lambda i_e, w_s . on\ fire(i)(w)$)(d)

• **De re ascription is *de dicto* ascription** (Kaplan 1968)

–“Replacing” his_i with a $\langle s, e \rangle$ description **D** for $\llbracket his_i \rrbracket^g = d$; e.g. **D** = *the guy in the mirror* (Kaplan 1968).

$\llbracket (1) \rrbracket^{de\ re} \leftrightarrow$ David believes *de dicto* that e.g. the guy in the mirror's pants are on fire:

(3) $\exists D_{\langle s, e \rangle} . think(\lambda i, w . on\ fire(D(w))(w))(d)$

–Note that λi binds nothing here (cf. ex. 2).

3. Some previous results

• **De re is compatible with *de se*(?)** (Zimmermann 1991)

(4) Some boys think, "I'm a bad writer," some think of selves "that guy's a bad writer."

✓ Everyone thinks he's a bad writer.

$\forall x . \exists D_{\langle s, e \rangle} . think(\lambda i, w . bad(D(w))(w))(x)$

–Conclusion: **D** can get attitude-bound (e.g. **D** = x_i).

• **Bonafide *de se* readings exist!**

(Percus & Sauerland 2003)

(5) Anna is only one who thinks, "I won!"

✓ Only ANNA realizes she won.

$only(realize(\lambda i, w . won(i)(w))(\llbracket ANNA \rrbracket^c))$

–Could arise w/*de re* LF if *de se* **D** supplied by context.

4. Interactions with anaphora

• **De se pronouns can bind *de re* anaphors** (Heim 1994).

–Molly, editor of a fiction journal, receives a submission from Will the plagiarist. Turns out it was something Molly wrote in grad school. Impressed with the piece and not recognizing her work, Molly decides to publish it.

(6) (Molly: "I want to publish that author!")

✓ Molly wants PRO to publish something by herself. (PRO always *de se*, cf. Chierchia 1989)

• **Can *de re* pronouns bind *de se* anaphors?** This requires a rather subtle argument (stay with me!).

–Scenario: Some boys are shown pictures of themselves in disguise, not realizing who they're looking at. Each is asked who he thought was a threat to who. Bill thinks person A is gonna kill B, but *he recognizes B as himself*.

(7) (Bill: "A is gonna kill me.")

✓/! After the experiment, Bill thought he was gonna kill himself.

–Indeed, (7) reported fine in Percus (lecture notes; thanks to a SALT reviewer for pointing this out), pace Sharvit (2010). But using Percus & Sauerland's (2003) tests, **we can see if this is due to a *de re* < *de se* reading...**

–Scenario: as before, Bill thinks A is gonna kill B, but *he recognizes B as himself*. Jim thinks C (Bill) is gonna kill D (Bill). Rob thinks E (Rob) is gonna kill F (Rob).

(8) (Bill: "A is gonna kill me.")

✗ After the experiment, only BILL thought that he was gonna kill himself.

–(8) is *only* possible with emphatic stress on the reflexive. Notice that this also makes obviously Condition A-violating analogs ok: *only MARY realized Bill was talking to HERSELF*.

–**Felicity of (7) isn't due to *de re* < *de se*. *De re* pronouns can't bind *de se* anaphors.**

–Crucially, no *de re* blocking of non-anaphoric pronouns (cf. Anand 2006).

• Notice that the reverse configuration (*de se* < *de re*) is OK:

–Scenario: as before, Bill thinks A is gonna kill B, but *he recognizes A as himself*. As before, Jim thinks C (Bill) is gonna kill D (Bill), and Rob thinks E (Rob) is gonna kill F (Rob).

(9) (Bill: "I'm gonna kill that bastard B.")

✓ After the experiment, only BILL thought that he was gonna kill himself.

–**This confirms there really is a *de se* < *de re* reading.**

5. This creates a problem

• **De re₁ pronouns bind *de re*₂ anaphors (construed relative to different descriptions).**

–Scenario: The scientists ask Steve who gave A (himself) his black eye. Steve points to B (himself).

(10) (Steve: "B gave A a black eye.")

✓ During the experiment, Steve thought that he was the one who'd given himself a black eye.

• **Taken together with Zimmermann's argument that *de re* is compatible with *de se*, this wrongly predicts that *de re* pronouns can bind *de se* anaphors.**

6. A proposal and its consequences

• **De re anaphors can't get *de se* Ds?**

–In other words, *de re* anaphors are never *de se*. This explains *de re* blocking of *de se* anaphors: they can't get λ -bound (cf. pane 2) because they cannot be \bar{A} -bound (cf. Condition A).

–The only way to make a *de se* anaphor is indirectly—viz. via a *de se* subject. Hence, *de re* blocking.

–NB: the anaphor and pronoun are still *covalued* in the relevant sense (assuming binding theory cares about *extensional/speaker-oriented* co-valuation). But without the λ -abstraction, there is no *de se* ascription.

• But this entails something interesting:

(11) Some male editors think "I wanna publish myself," some "I wanna publish that guy (himself)."

✓ Everyone wants to publish something by himself.

–Parallel to Zimmermann's (4), and just as true in a mixed scenario. But given the stipulation about anaphoric **Ds**, we'd expect it to be false.

–Upshot: to the extent that we need to rule out *de se* **Ds** for anaphors (and I think we do), there's no reason to believe that *de re* is ever compatible with *de se*.

• **Claim: *de re* pronouns are never *de se*.**

–So what's up with the Zimmermann cases? (Whatever it is, it's likely what makes (7) OK-ish as well.)

–A tentative proposal (though see Sharvit 2010) for another view): the Zimmermann cases are felicitous not because *de re* LFs are compatible with *de se* readings but because *de se* scenarios are also *de re* scenarios.

–A scenario in which John thinks, "I'm hungry" is a scenario in which John thinks of John under some guise that he's hungry. A *de re* LF thus maps to true.

–But we should distinguish bonafide *de se* ascriptions, ones which are associated with a special syntax and semantics (\bar{A} binding \rightsquigarrow property ascription). These cannot result from *de re* LFs.

References

Anand. 2006. *De De Se*. Chierchia. 1989. Anaphora and attitudes *de se*. Heim. 1994. Puzzling reflexive pronouns in *de se* reports. Kaplan. 1968. Quantifying in. Lewis. 1979. Attitudes *De Dicto* and *De se*. Sharvit. 2010. Covaluation and Unexpected BT Effects.