

# The grammar of exceptional scope

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[slides at [tiny.cc/ges-umd](http://tiny.cc/ges-umd)]

## Goals for today

- ▶ A general theory of the **exceptional scope** (i.e., island-escaping) behavior of indefinites, focus, *wh*-in-situ.
- ▶ Based on a new kind of **alternative semantics**, where alternatives interact with their semantic context by **taking scope**.
- ▶ I'll argue that we should prefer this kind of approach to standard varieties of alternative semantics:
  - ▶ More compositional
  - ▶ Better predictions when multiple sources of alternatives
  - ▶ A more robust treatment of binding
  - ▶ Super modular, extensible (e.g., if we have time, to dynamics)

## More generally

- ▶ Someday, you might find yourself faced with a dilemma.
- ▶ You have a meat-and-potatoes semantics—maybe Fregean, maybe Neo-Davidsonian—but you decide you need some fancy stuff:
  - ▶ Alternatives
  - ▶ Intensionality
  - ▶ Dynamics
  - ▶ 2-dimensionality
  - ▶ ...
- ▶ Turns out the fanciness and the M&P don't play nice. Your choice:
  - ▶ Should you rewrite the meat-and-potatoes grammar wholesale (i.e., specify a new lexicon and new semantics for combination)?
  - ▶ Or should you try to grease the skids?
- ▶ This talk: why you should choose door #2.

# Where we are

## Islands and alternatives

Exceptional scope

Standard alternative semantics

## Proposal: alternatives take scope

Basic pieces

Deriving exceptional scope

## Why scope?

Compositionality

Selectivity

Binding

## Horizons

Dynamics

Concluding

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## Some data

- ▶ Each of the following can be interpreted in a way that gives the **bolded** thing apparent scope outside a syntactic ⟨island⟩.
  - (1) If ⟨**a rich relative of mine** dies⟩, I'll inherit a house. ( $\exists > \text{if}$ )
  - (2) I only complain when ⟨**BILL** leaves the lights on⟩.
  - (3) Taro-wa ⟨**dare**-ga katta mochi-o⟩ tabemasita ka?  
Taro-TOP who-NOM bought rice cake-ACC ate Q  
'Who is the  $x$  such that Taro ate rice cakes that  $x$  bought?'

[Examples after Reinhart 1997; Rooth 1996; Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002]

# What we might hope for

- ▶ Rooth (1985, 1992, 1996) developed a theory that countenanced island-sensitivity for focus (more on that shortly).
- ▶ However:
  - The group of island-escaping operators does not appear to be an arbitrary one.... [Their] semantic similarity, together with the common insensitivity to scope islands, suggest that we should not be satisfied with a theory which treats focus as *sui generis*. (Rooth 1996)
- ▶ To date, hasn't happened:
  - ▶ Extant accounts are piecemeal accounts.
  - ▶ Even so, they over- and/or under- generate for their more narrowly construed empirical domains.

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## Alternative semantics

- ▶ Some expressions introduce alternatives into the semantics, causing us to calculate a number of meanings in parallel.
- ▶ E.g., indefinites might be taken to denote **sets of individuals**:

$$\llbracket \text{a linguist} \rrbracket^g = \{x \mid \text{LING } x\}$$

- ▶ Cf. the standard generalized-quantifier semantics:

$$\llbracket \text{a linguist} \rrbracket^g = \lambda\kappa. \exists x. \text{LING } x \wedge \kappa x$$

## Composing alternatives

- ▶ **Compositional challenge:**  $\llbracket \text{a linguist} \rrbracket^g$  is type  $e \rightarrow t$ , but occurs in places where something of type  $e$  standardly expected.
- ▶ The usual way to go: first, suppose that **everything** denotes a set:


$$\llbracket \text{John} \rrbracket^g = \{J\} \quad \llbracket \text{met} \rrbracket^g = \{\text{MET}\} \quad \llbracket \text{a ling} \rrbracket^g = \{x \mid \text{LING } x\}$$

- ▶ Then, to compose these sets, use *point-wise* functional application (**PWFA**) (e.g. Hamblin 1973; Root 1985):

$$\llbracket A B \rrbracket^g = \{f x \mid f \in \llbracket A \rrbracket^g \wedge x \in \llbracket B \rrbracket^g\}$$

## An example


- ▶ A basic example, *John met a linguist*:



- ▶ As we climb the tree, the alternatives **expand**, eventually yielding a set of propositions, **one per linguist**.

## Getting traction on island-insensitivity

- ▶ Island-insensitivity is a **consequence of PWFA**. Here's an alternatives-based derivation of the *relative-of-mine* conditional:



- ▶ The indefinite acquires a kind of “scope” over the conditional, yielding various conditional propositions “about” various relatives.

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## Proposal summarized

- ▶ In general, when we posit enriched meanings (e.g., sets of alternatives), we have a choice:
  - ▶ A fancier lexicon, enriched modes of composition (i.e., PWFA).
  - ▶ Greasing the skids some other way.
- ▶ My proposal: door #2. **No** PWFA, **no** ubiquitous lexical sets.
- ▶ Reframe (and *generalize*) the compositional issue to a problem of integrating **fancy** things (e.g., things that denote sets) with **boring** things (e.g., things that do not).
- ▶ Resolve the type mismatch introduced by a set of alternatives by **scoping it** (cf. quantifiers in object position).

## Greasing the skids

- ▶ All this requires is a couple **type-shifters**.
- ▶ First,  $\boxed{\cdot}$  turns a boring thing into a (minimally) fancy thing:

$$\boxed{x} := \{x\}$$

- ▶ Second:  $\cdot^*$  turns a set  $\mathfrak{m}$  into a scope-taker by feeding each member of  $\mathfrak{m}$  to a scope  $\kappa$  and unioning the resulting sets.

$$\mathfrak{m}^* := \lambda\kappa. \bigcup_{x \in \mathfrak{m}} \kappa x$$

- ▶  $\boxed{\cdot}$  and  $\cdot^*$  entail PWFA:

$$\mathfrak{m}^* (\lambda f. \mathfrak{n}^* (\lambda x. \boxed{f x})) = \{f x \mid f \in \mathfrak{m} \wedge x \in \mathfrak{n}\}$$




## Fancy, boring types

- ▶ Typing judgments, where  $F\tau$  should be read as “a fancy  $\tau$ ”. In this case, a fancy  $\tau$  is simply a set of  $\tau$ 's, so  $F\tau ::= \{\tau\} ::= \tau \rightarrow \mathbf{t}$ :

$$\boxed{\cdot} :: \tau \rightarrow F\tau \qquad \cdot^* :: \underbrace{F\tau}_{\text{alternative generator}} \rightarrow \overbrace{(\tau \rightarrow F\sigma)}^{\text{scope}} \rightarrow \underbrace{F\sigma}_{\text{result}}$$

## An example

- ▶ An example of how this works to derive the same result as PWFA for *John met a linguist*:



- ▶ Gives the expected set of propositions, about different linguists:

$$\{MET x J \mid LING x\}$$

- ▶ This pattern will be repeated time and again. The alternative generator takes scope via  $\cdot^*$ , and  $\boxed{\cdot}$  applies to its remnant.

## Multiple alternative generators

- ▶ Cases with multiple sources of alternatives such as *a linguist met a philosopher* require two applications of  $\cdot^*$ , and two scopings:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{A-LING}^* (\lambda x. \mathbf{A-PHIL}^* (\lambda y. \boxed{\text{MET } y \ x})) \\ = \{ \text{MET } y \ x \mid \text{LING } x \wedge \text{PHIL } y \} \end{aligned}$$

- ▶ This is the same result PWFA would give.

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
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## Exceptional scope?


- ▶ Since we manage alternatives via scope, it may appear as if we have given up an account of exceptional scope-taking:  
(4) If **⟨a rich relative of mine dies⟩**, I'll inherit a house.
- ▶ In fact, this is not so! The grammar generates an exceptional scope reading for this case by *scoping the island*:



- ▶ The result is the same set of alternatives derived by PWFA:

$$\{DIES\ x \Rightarrow HOUSE \mid RELATIVE\ x\}$$

## Why does this work?



- ▶ The alternativeness induced by the indefinite is inherited by the island, and then transmitted to the conditional via  $\cdot^*$ .
- ▶ In other words, the island is “about” relatives in **the same way** as the indefinite!  $\cdot^*$  simply passes this aboutness to the conditional.
- ▶ So we explain exceptional scope as the result of **LF pied-piping** (Nishigauchi 1990; von Stechow 1996): movement of the island gives the appearance of exceptional scope for things on the island.

## Antecedents

- ▶ These shifters are already familiar!
- ▶  $\square$  is Karttunen 1977's  $C_o$ , aka Partee 1986's IDENT.
- ▶  $\{x \mid \text{LING } x\}^* = \lambda\kappa. \bigcup_{\text{LING } x} \kappa x$  is the meaning Cresti 1995 assigns to *which linguist* (see also Heim 2000; Ciardelli & Roelofsen 2015).
  - ▶ But none of these folks factor out  $\cdot^*$  separately.

# The Monad Slide

- ▶  $\square$  and  $\cdot^*$  are decompositions of LIFT (e.g. Partee 1986):

$$\square^* = \text{LIFT } \chi = \lambda \kappa. \kappa \chi$$

- ▶ They also form something known in category theory & computer science as a **monad** (e.g. Moggi 1989; Wadler 1992, 1995).
  - ▶ In general, monads are *really* good at allowing (arbitrarily) fancy things to interact with boring things.
  - ▶ See e.g. Shan 2002; Giorgolo & Asudeh 2012; Unger 2012; Charlow 2014 for discussions of monads in natural language semantics.



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## Getting closure

- ▶ We can define a categorematic **closure** operation to extract a truth-condition from a set of propositions:

$$!m := \exists p \in m. p$$

- ▶ For example, applying ! to what we obtained for *a linguist met a philosopher* yields:

$$\exists x. \text{LING } x \wedge \exists y. \text{PHIL } y \wedge \text{MET } y \ x$$

## Compositionality (YMMV)

- ▶ PWFA-based grammars rely on syncategorematic rules for closure operations (see e.g. Rooth 1992; Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002):

$$\llbracket !X \rrbracket_{\text{PWFA}}^g := \{ \exists p \in \llbracket X \rrbracket^g . p \}$$

- ▶ The reason: PWFA-style grammars are simply *built to point-wise compose sets*. If ever you want to do anything else (like quantify over a set), you need a new composition rule.
  - ▶ Cf. Simons 2005; Rooth & Dong 2011.

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## Selective exceptional scope for indefinites

- ▶ Datum: indefinites can take *selective* scope outside islands. E.g., the following allows an any-old-lawyer, one-rich-relative reading:

(5) If **⟨a good lawyer visits a relative of mine⟩**, I'll get a house!

- ▶ The reading of interest, truth-conditionally:

$$\exists y. \text{RELATIVE } y \wedge \left( (\exists x. \text{LAWYER } x \wedge \text{VISITS } y \ x) \Rightarrow \text{HOUSE} \right)$$

## Selective exceptional scope for *wh*-in-situ

- ▶ It's possible for a *wh*-island-bound in-situ *wh* to take matrix scope, even as its island-mate takes local scope (Baker 1970):

(6) \*What do you know ⟨who bought \_⟩?

(7) Who knows ⟨who bought what⟩?

*A knows who bought X, B knows who bought Y, ...*

- ▶ Possible even in *wh*-in-situ languages with otherwise robust *wh*-island effects (Dayal 1996; Nishigauchi 1999). E.g., Japanese:


(8) Dare-ga ⟨Mary-ga doko-de nani-o katta ka⟩ sitte imasu ka?  
who-NOM Mary-NOM where-at what-ACC bought KA know be-HON KA  
'Who knows where Mary bought what?'

## Selective exceptional scope for focus

- ▶ A closely related case in the domain of focus interpretation (cf. examples in Rooth 1996; Wold 1996; Beck 2006; Krifka 2006):

(9) A: [John only gripes ⟨when MARY leaves lights on⟩]<sub>3</sub>.

B: No, C<sub>3</sub> ~ [he only gripes ⟨when SUE leaves lights on⟩].





## Selectivity and PWFA

- ▶ Circling back to the multiple-indefinites example:

(5) If **⟨a good lawyer visits a relative of mine⟩**, I'll get a house!

- ▶ PWFA has a problem. It doesn't do selective scope-taking, since it only generates **flat** alternative sets. example:

$$\llbracket \langle \dots \rangle \rrbracket_{PWFA}^g = \{ \text{VISITS } \mathbf{y} \ \mathbf{x} \mid \text{LAWYER } \mathbf{x} \wedge \text{RELATIVE } \mathbf{y} \}$$

- ▶ Using this set, there's no way to give one indefinite scope over the conditional without bringing the other along for the ride.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Though you *could* posit an existential closure operator somewhere inside the island in (5), this isn't a general solution.

- ▶ Considering examples like these, Rooth concludes:

[Their] theoretical impact is quite dramatic: the recursive definition of alternatives [SC: i.e. PWFA-based semantics] has no advantage over the scoping approach to the logical form of focus. (Rooth 1996)

## How about our theory?

- ▶ It might seem that we're similarly out of luck.
- ▶ Suppose we derived a meaning for *a persuasive lawyer visits a relative of mine* along these lines:

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathbf{A-RELATIVE}^* (\lambda y. \mathbf{A-LAWYER}^* (\lambda x. \boxed{\text{VISITS } y \ x})) \\ & = \{ \text{VISITS } y \ x \mid \text{LAWYER } x \wedge \text{RELATIVE } y \} \end{aligned}$$

- ▶ But LF pied-piping this meaning over the conditional gives **both** indefinites widest scope!

$$\{ \text{VISITS } y \ x \mid \text{LAWYER } x \wedge \text{RELATIVE } y \}^* (\lambda p. \dots \Rightarrow \dots)$$

## Selectivity lurks

- ▶ However! An alternative derivation for the island lurks.

$$\text{A.RELATIVE}^* \left( \lambda y. \boxed{\text{A.LAWYER}^* (\lambda x. \boxed{\text{VISITS } y \ x})} \right)$$

- ▶ The key bit is the extra  $\square$ . This gives rise to a *higher-order* alternative set, type FFt (cf. e.g. Dayal 1996, 2002; Fox 2012):


$$\{ \{ \text{VISITS } y \ x \mid \text{LAWYER } x \} \mid \text{RELATIVE } y \}$$

- ▶ I.e., if the lawyers are  $L_1$  and  $L_2$ , and my relatives are  $R_1$  and  $R_2$ :

$$\{ \{ \text{VISITS } R_1 \ L_1, \text{VISITS } R_1 \ L_2 \}, \\ \{ \text{VISITS } R_2 \ L_1, \text{VISITS } R_2 \ L_2 \} \}$$

## How it works


- LF pied-piping the higher-order alternative set derives the selective exceptional scope reading:



- The result is exactly what we're looking for (any-old-lawyer, one-rich-relative):

$$\{(\exists x. \text{LAWYER } x \wedge \text{VISITS } y \ x) \Rightarrow \text{HOUSE} \mid \text{RELATIVE } y\}$$

## Why it works



- ▶ The finely-articulated higher-order alternative set lets us separate the relative-alternatives from the lawyer-alternatives.
- ▶ The island, when derived in this way, is **“about” relatives in a way it *isn't* “about” lawyers**.  $\cdot^*$  spreads this aboutness to the conditional.
- ▶ The inner layer of alternatives **semantically reconstructs** (Cresti 1995) – i.e., gets sent back down the tree to meet  $!$ .

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# Abstraction

- ▶ Binding creates headaches for PWFA (e.g. Shan 2004; Romero & Novel 2013; Charlow 2014; Ciardelli & Roelofsen 2015).
- ▶ E.g., Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002's abstraction definition, below, over-generates alternative functions.  $\llbracket n X \rrbracket^g$  is no longer guaranteed to be "about" the same things as  $\llbracket X \rrbracket^g$ .

$$\llbracket n X \rrbracket_{PWFA}^g := \{f \mid \forall x. f x \in \llbracket X \rrbracket^g[n \rightarrow x]\}$$

- ▶ Problematic prediction: *nobody met a linguist* can mean that nobody met *every* linguist. See Charlow 2014 (§5.5) for details.
- ▶ Jettisoning PWFA in favor of standard FA (with  $\Box$  and  $\cdot^*$  greasing the skids) gives us access to a standard abstraction operation.



## Glass houses, etc.

- ▶ Yet it may appear that we have binding issues of our own.
- ▶ Ex. (10) has a reading giving the island-bound indefinite widest scope, even as the pronoun on the island is bound by the subject.

(10) Every linguist<sub>*i*</sub> is overjoyed whenever ⟨**a famous expert on indefinites** cites her<sub>*i*</sub>⟩.

- ▶ How is this consistent with our theory? Shouldn't scoping the island over the quantifier unbind the pronoun?

:(

- ▶ It's true: we can't handle data like this if binding requires LF c-command (as in e.g. Heim & Kratzer 1998). Given the situation with two indefinites on an island, this comes as a surprise.

:)

- ▶ What we require is a (minimal) shift in perspective, to a semantics that allows **binding reconstruction** à la Sternefeld 1998, 2001.
- ▶ The key is allowing things to denote *functions from assignments* into values (cf. Montague 1974; Bennett 1979; Rooth 1985[!]).
- ▶ An example of how this goes for *her<sub>i</sub> mother, Polly<sub>i</sub> likes*:

$$\begin{aligned} & \left( \underbrace{\lambda F. \lambda g. \text{LIKES } (F \text{ } g [0 \rightarrow P]) P}_{\text{Polly}_0 \text{ likes } \_} \right) \left( \underbrace{\lambda g. g_0 \text{'S MOM}}_{\text{her}_0 \text{ mom}} \right) \\ & = \lambda g. \text{LIKES } (P \text{'S MOM}) P \end{aligned}$$

## Generalized fanciness

- ▶ Implementing this perspective simply means tweaking our notion of what a “fancy” meaning is.
- ▶ Echoing the theory of binding reconstruction, we’ll now take fancy  $\tau$ ’s to be **functions from assignments** (type  $s$ ) into sets of  $\tau$ ’s.

$$F\tau ::= s \rightarrow \{\tau\}$$

- ▶ This in turn implies minimally tweaked versions of  $\boxed{\cdot}$  and  $\cdot^*$ :<sup>2</sup>

$$\boxed{x} := \lambda g. \{x\} \qquad m^* := \lambda \kappa. \lambda g. \bigcup_{x \in m g} \kappa x g$$

- ▶ Such that (cf.  $\llbracket A B \rrbracket_{PWFA}^g = \{f x \mid f \in \llbracket A \rrbracket^g \wedge x \in \llbracket B \rrbracket^g\}$ ):

$$m^* \left( \lambda f. n^* \left( \lambda x. \boxed{f x} \right) \right) = \lambda g. \{f x \mid f \in m g \wedge x \in n g\}$$

<sup>2</sup>Still a monad, still decompositions of LIFT!

# Decomposing

- ▶ How granular should you be? Could further decompose.
- ▶ One set of shifters for nondeterminism:


$$\boxed{x}_1 := \{x\} \qquad m^{*1} := \lambda \kappa. \bigcup_{x \in m} \kappa x$$

- ▶ And a second set for assignment-sensitivity:

$$\boxed{x}_2 := \lambda g. x \qquad m^{*2} := \lambda \kappa. \lambda g. \kappa (m g) g$$

## How this works

- ▶ The derivation of (10) is **entirely parallel** to the two-indefinites case. We build a higher-order FFt and reconstruct the inner layer:



- ▶ The tree invokes  $\blacktriangleright$ , a placeholder for your fave way to do binding (e.g. Partee 1973's Derived VP Rule, Buring 2005's  $\beta$ -binding).

# Roofing

- ▶ We shouldn't be able to wide-scope the indefinite in **roofing** configurations (e.g. Schwarz 2001; Brasoveanu & Farkas 2011):

(11) No candidate<sub>i</sub> submitted a paper he<sub>j</sub> wrote.

- ▶ We make the correct prediction. Here's how we'd go about trying to give this indefinite scope over the subject:

$$\left( \overbrace{\left( \lambda g. \{y \mid \underbrace{\text{WROTE } y \ g_0}_{\text{ABOUT ME}}\} \right)^*}_{\text{[a paper he}_0 \text{ wrote]}} \left( \lambda y. \text{NO-CAND} \left( \lambda x. \boxed{\text{SUBMITTED } y \ x} \right) \right)^* \right)$$

- ▶ The resulting set of propositions are “about” things that  $g_0$  wrote (given an assignment  $g$ ). Binding fails!

## Roofing (cont.)

- ▶ This improves on choice-functional accounts of exceptional scope (e.g. Reinhart 1997), which can assign roofed indefinites a kind of wide scope (Schwarz 2001; see also Geurts 2000):

$$\exists f. \text{NO-CANDIDATE} (\lambda x. \text{SUBMITTED} (f \{y \mid \text{WROTE } y \ x\}) x)$$

$\approx$  NO CANDIDATE SUBMITTED *EVERY* PAPER HE WROTE

- ▶ About which Heim 2011 remarks:  
We may have to concede what Fodor and Sag and most subsequent authors wanted to avoid: indefinites are existential quantifiers that enjoy a greater degree of scopal mobility... (Heim 2011: 1022)
- ▶ I hope to have shown that we *don't* have to concede this.



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## Basic data

- ▶ A familiar data point: Indefinites behave more like names than quantifiers with respect to anaphoric phenomena.

(12) {Polly<sub>i</sub>, a linguist<sub>i</sub>, \*every linguist<sub>i</sub>} came in. She<sub>j</sub> sat.

## Discourse referents

- ▶ Dynamic semantics: sentences add discourse referents to the “conversational scoreboard” (e.g. Groenendijk & Stokhof 1991):

$$g \longrightarrow \llbracket \text{Polly came in} \rrbracket \longrightarrow g + p$$

- ▶ Indefinites (but not quantifiers) also set up discourse referents. In case four linguists came in – A, B, C, and D – we’ll have:

$$g \longrightarrow \llbracket \text{a linguist came in} \rrbracket \begin{cases} \longrightarrow g + A \\ \longrightarrow g + B \\ \longrightarrow g + C \\ \longrightarrow g + D \end{cases}$$

- ▶ Formally captured by modeling meanings as relations on states. For example, here is a candidate meaning for *a linguist came in*:

$$\lambda g. \{g + x \mid \text{LING } x \wedge \text{CAME } x\}$$

## Incorporating dynamics

- ▶ Dynamics relies on the ability to output modified assignments (indeed, given indefinites, to output *alternative* assignments).
- ▶ One way to think of this is in terms of a new “fancy” type:

$$\mathbb{F}\tau ::= s \rightarrow \{\langle \tau, s \rangle\}$$

- ▶ The relevant  $\boxed{\cdot}$  and  $\cdot^*$  again essentially follow from the types:<sup>3</sup>

$$\boxed{x} := \lambda g. \{\langle x, g \rangle\} \qquad m^* := \lambda \kappa. \lambda g. \bigcup_{\langle x, h \rangle \in m g} \kappa x h$$

- ▶ Gives the following enriched functional application:

$$m^* \left( \lambda f. n^* \left( \lambda x. \boxed{f x} \right) \right) = \lambda g. \{\langle f x, i \rangle \mid \langle f, h \rangle \in m g \wedge \langle x, i \rangle \in n h\}$$

<sup>3</sup>Still a monad, *still* decompositions of LIFT!

# Decomposing

- ▶ Again, how granular should you be? Could further decompose.
- ▶ One set of shifters for nondeterminism:


$$\boxed{x}_1 := \{x\} \qquad m^{*1} := \lambda \kappa. \bigcup_{x \in m} \kappa x$$

- ▶ And a second set for assignment update:

$$\boxed{x}_2 := \lambda g. \langle x, g \rangle \qquad m^{*2} := \lambda \kappa. \lambda g. \kappa (m g)_L (m g)_R$$

## Dynamic binding via LF pied-piping

- ▶ Remarkably, rejiggering the semantics in this way predicts that dynamic binding *also* arises via a kind of LF pied-piping:



- ▶ Unlike standard dynamic approaches, this derivation doesn't require a notion of dynamic conjunction.
  - ▶ In keeping with the approach I've been advocating, conjunction is boring and interacts with fancy things via  $\square$  and  $\cdot^*$ .

## Dynamics and exceptional scope: binding and sloppiness

- ▶ Proper names can bind pronouns, no matter how embedded:

(13) If e.o.  $\langle$ who hates Walt $_i$  $\rangle$  comes, I'll feel bad for him $_i$

If e.o.  $\langle$ who hates PETE $_j$  $\rangle$  comes, I won't (feel bad for him $_j$ ).

- ▶ Predicted: so long as the  $\langle$ island $\rangle$  can scope over the pronoun, the proper name can bind the pronoun.



## Dynamics and exceptional scope: max discourse anaphora

- ▶ **Maximal drefs** contributed by deeply embedded quantifiers:

(14) Everyone heard the rumor that  $\langle$ at most six [senators]<sub>*i*</sub> [supported Cruz's filibuster]<sub>*j*</sub> $\rangle$ . It turned out to be erroneous: they<sub>*i*∩*j*</sub> numbered at least ten.

- ▶ Suggests even quantifiers take a kind of exceptional scope.
- ▶ Predicted if quantifiers introduce maximal drefs, as is standard in modern dynamic semantics (Kamp & Reyle 1993):

$$\text{AT-MOST-SIX-SENATORS} = \lambda\kappa. \lambda g. \left\{ \left\{ | \text{SEN} \cap X | \leq 6, g + X \right\} \right\}$$

where  $X = \text{SEN} \cap \{x \mid \exists \langle p, h \rangle \in \kappa x g. p\}$

## Summing up

$F\tau$	$\boxed{x}$	$m^*$	$[[a\ linguist]]_{Fe}$	$[[she_0]]_{Fe}$
$\tau$	$x$	$\lambda\kappa. \kappa\ m$	N/A	$g_0$
$\{\tau\}$	$\{x\}$	$\lambda\kappa. \bigcup_{x \in m} \kappa\ x$	$\{x \mid LING\ x\}$	$\{g_0\}$
$s \rightarrow \{\tau\}$	$\lambda g. \{x\}$	$\lambda\kappa g. \bigcup_{x \in m_g} \kappa\ x\ g$	$\lambda g. \{x \mid LING\ x\}$	$\lambda g. \{g_0\}$
$s \rightarrow \{\langle\tau, s\rangle\}$	$\lambda g. \{\langle x, g \rangle\}$	$\lambda\kappa g. \bigcup_{\langle x, h \rangle \in m_g} \kappa\ x\ h$	$\lambda g. \{\langle x, g \rangle \mid LING\ x\}$	$\lambda g. \{\langle g_0, g \rangle\}$

Progressively enriching a grammar with alternatives, alternatives + assignment-sensitivity, and alternatives + assignment modification.

# Where we are

## Islands and alternatives

- Exceptional scope

- Standard alternative semantics

## Proposal: alternatives take scope

- Basic pieces

- Deriving exceptional scope

## Why scope?

- Compositionality

- Selectivity

- Binding

## Horizons

- Dynamics

- Concluding

## Concluding

- ▶ My bottom line: use alternatives, and let them take scope.<sup>4</sup>
- ▶  $\square$  and  $\cdot^*$  allow a robust account of alternatives, avoiding many of the pitfalls of PWFA (and other theories of exceptional scope).
- ▶ The approach is **really** flexible:
  - ▶ Folding in dynamics is a piece of cake. Other extensions similarly straightforward (e.g., to Potts 2005-style 2-dimensionality).
  - ▶ Suggests that dynamic and alternative semantics have all along been palping different parts of the indefiniteness elephant.
- ▶ More generally, there's a systematic way to deal with enrichments to meat-and-potatoes semantic regimes that systematically predicts exceptional scope phenomena.

<sup>4</sup>The centrality of scope-taking to natural language semantics has likewise been emphasized in work on *continuations* (e.g. Barker & Shan 2014).

## Last words

- ▶ I focused on English indefinites, but the same strategy allows us to give parallel, empirically robust accounts of focus and in situ *wh* (and, potentially, of how they *interact*):

The group of island-escaping operators does not appear to be an arbitrary one.... [Their] semantic similarity, together with the common insensitivity to scope islands, suggest that we should not be satisfied with a theory which treats focus as *sui generis*. We would like to replace the focus-specific definition with a theory in which focus is one of a family of island-insensitive operators.... It is not at all clear to me how this should be done. (Rooth 1996)

- ▶ I hope to have shed some light on this.

**THANKS!**

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